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THE UNIVERSAL IDEAL OF JUSTICE
AND OUR IMMIGRATION LAWS
Jack Wasserman*
Mr. Chief Justice Warren recently observed that:
Ever since Hammurabi published his code to 'hold back the strong
from oppressing the weak,' the success of any legal system is measured
by its fidelity to the universal ideal of justice.1
In evaluating any statute enacted by Congress, one might well ask
whether the law is just or fair and how it measures up to our Anglo-American
concept of the universal ideal of justice. Laws imbued with this ideal will be
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. They will respect the dignity of man, the
sanctity of his marriage relationship and the unity of his family. They will rec-
ognize the principle of forgiveness and the necessity of procedural fairness.
Finally, they will avoid vague and ambiguous standards and proclaim their
mandate with clarity, directness and simplicity. The objective of this article
will be to analyze our immigration statutes in the light of this universal ideal of
justice - an ideal which incorporates other ideals - those of equality, reason-
ableness, fairness, respect for family life, and clarity as well as simplicity.
I. TrE IDEAL OF EQUALITY"
In 1947 the President's Committee on Civil Rights observed:
The central theme in our American heritage is the importance of the
individual person. From the earliest moment of our history we have
believed that every human being has an essential dignity and integrity
which must be respected and safeguarded. Moreover, we believe that
the welfare of the individual is the final goal of group life. Our Ameri-
can heritage further teaches that to be secure in the rights he wishes
for himself, each man must be willing to respect the rights of other
men. This is the conscious recognition of a basic moral principle: all
men are created equal as well as free .... This concept of equality
which is so vital a part of the American heritage knows no kinship
with notions of human uniformity or regimentation. We abhor the
totalitarian arrogance which makes one man say that he will respect
another man as his equal only if he has 'my race, my religion, my
political views, my social position.' In our land men are equal, but
they are free to be different. From these differences among our people
have come the great human and national strength of America .... We
can tolerate no restrictions upon the individual which depend upon
irrelevant factors such as his race, his color, his religion or the social
position to which he is born. 2
" LL.B. Harvard. Member of the District of Columbia and New York Bars. Former Member of
the Board of Immigration Appeals, Department of Justice. Past-president, Association of Immigration
and Nationality Lawyers. Vice Chairman, Immigration Committee of the American Bar Association.
I Warren, The Law and the Future, Fortune, Nov. 1955, p. 124.
2 1947 REPORT OF PRwswaNT's COMImssION ON CivIL RIGHTs 4.
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The ideal of equality has permeated our thinking in our United Nations
activities. We led the fight over Russian objections for the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which declares, inter alia, that the
right to freedom of movement and residence within a state shall be enjoyed
"without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status."
3
Our American heritage of equality has given us prestige among the
nations of the world and a strong feeling of pride at home.4 However, our
heritage and our aspirations have fallen short of our goals in relation to our
immigration laws.
Originally only white persons were qualified for naturalization. 5 Aliens
of African descent became eligible in 18708 but it was not until 1940 that
our native born Indian and the Eskimo were granted permission to seek
naturalization.7 Recognition of the international aspects of our discriminatory
laws led to the removal of barriers of citizenship ineligibility from those of
Chinese origin in 1943,8 those of Filipino and East Indian origin in 1946,9
and those of Japanese, Korean and all other races in 1952.10 Thus, today we
have achieved equality in our naturalization laws. Neither national origin,
race, nor place of birth restrict an alien seeking naturalization in the land of
freedom and equality. Our immigration laws, however, have not kept pace
with our naturalization provisions.
Hostility and intolerance directed against the Chinese and a feeling that
they were racially inferior led to the barring of Chinese immigrant laborers
for a ten year period in 1882.11 With subsequent modifications and extensions,
the exclusion of Chinese remained national policy until 1943.12 In 1917
aliens of an area known as the barred zone, described by degrees of latitude
and longitude, were declared inadmissible to the United States solely by
reason of the accident of their birth in the territories included within this
area. 13 The primary purposes of this barred-zone provision were to exclude
3 U.N. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS art. 2. See art. 13.
4 REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 2 at 9.
5 Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103.
6 Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 256.
7 Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 303, 54 Stat. 1140. See Gordon, The Racial Barrier to
American Citizenship, 93 U. PA. L. REv. 237 (1945).
8 Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 3, 57 Stat. 601. See Gordon, Our Wall of Exclusion Against
China, 3 LAw. GuILD REV. 3, 7 (1943).
9 Act of July 2, 1946, ch. 534, § 1, 60 Stat. 416. In 1950 persons of Guamanian descent became
eligible. Act of Aug. 1, 1950, ch. 512, § 4(b), 64 Stat. 385.
10 66 Stat. 239, 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1952).
11 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58.
12 The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was amended in 1884, Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, § 1, 23
Stat. 115, and repealed, but replaced in 1888, Act of Sept. 13, 1888, ch. 1015, 25 Stat. 476. It was
extended for another ten years in 1892, Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 1, 27 Stat. 25, and was re-
affirmed in 1902, Act of April 29, 1902, ch. 641, § 1, 32 Stat. 176, and in 1904, Act of April 27, 1904,
ch. 1630, § 5, 33 Stat. 428. It was finally repealed in 1943, Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600.
13 Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 876. The barred-zone provision rendered inadmissable
natives of parts of China, all of India, Burma, Siam, the Malay States, a small part of the Soviet
Union, part of Arabia, part of Afghanistan, most of the Polynesian Islands and the East Indian Islands.
Excepted by a box cut out of the area were natives of Persia, natives of a part of Afghanistan and a
part of Russia.
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Hindus and to make the exclusion of Asiatics more complete. In 1922 Dr.
Harry H. Laughlin of the Eugenics-Record Office of the Carnegie Institute
of Washington was appointed by the House Immigration Committee to study
the biological aspects of immigration. His report to the House Committee,
together with a rising feeling of isolationism and anti-alien antagonism, is
credited with considerable influence in the enactment of the Immigration
Act of 1924.1 Dr. Laughlin concluded that recent immigrants present a
higher percentage of inborn socially inadequate qualities than do the older
stocks.' 5 The report was widely criticized and has been generally discredited. 16
The 1924 Immigration Act restricted the admission of aliens to the United
States upon the basis of quotas computed according to the census of 1890,"
and rendered inadmissible for permanent residence all, including Japanese,
who were racially ineligible for American citizenship.
The 1924 Act produced a sharp conflict, and was the subject of diver-
gent congressional reports. Secretary of State Hughes called the Immigration
Committee's attention to the objections of Japan that the incorporation of a
provision excluding those ineligible for citizenship violated the Gentlemen's
Agreement with Japan' 8 as well as treaty provisions, and that it would undo
the work of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armaments. 19 He
also indicated that the use of 1890 as a census base would be likely to offend
Italy, Roumania and other countries which considered the legislation "as an
unjust discrimination, de facto if not de jure, enacted to the detriment of a
friendly nation." The majority of the House Committee rejected these protests,
concluded that our immigration policy was a domestic issue, and that the bill
was not inconsistent with any treaty provisions or agreements. In its report,
the majority stated that the racial status quo in the United States had to be
preserved, and that the arrival in great numbers of unassimilable aliens from
the southern and eastern part of Europe tended "to upset our balance of
population, to depress our standard of living, and to unduly charge our
institutions for the care of the socially inadequate." 0 A vigorous minority
report was filed charging that the bill was confessedly discriminatory in its
operation, and that it imposed an arbitrary and adventitious test not in keep-
ing with the traditions of our national policy. In the words of the report:2 '
The obvious purpose of this discrimination, however much it may
now be disavowed, is the adoption of an unfounded anthropological
14 Ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153. See GA~us, IMMIGRATION REsTRiCTiON 239-40 (1927).
15 Hearings Before the House Committee on Immigration, America's Modern Melting Pot, 67th
Cong., 3rd Sess. 729 (1922), ser. 7-c (1923).
16 Gllam, Statistics and the Immigration Problem, 30 AMmICAN J. OF SOCIOLoGY 29 (1924-25);
Jennings, Undesirable Aliens, 51 SuRvEY 309 (1923); Kirkpatrick, Selective Immigration, 3 J. oF
SocuL FORCES 497 (1925).
17 The 1924 quotas for each year were limited to two percentum of the number of foreign born of
each nationality resident in the United States as determined by the census of 1890. No quotas were
given to nationals of countries ineligible for citizenship and no quota limitations were imposed upon
persons born in the Western Hemisphere. An alien's quota was determined by place of birth except
for Asiatics whose quotas were determined by racial origin.
18 Under the Gentlemen's Agreement with Japan, that country voluntarily undertook to check
emigration to the United States. Gms, op. cit. supra note 14, at 312.
19 The 1924 Immigration Act was regarded as a deliberate insult by the Japanese people and
serious anti-American feeling was aroused in Japan. Id., at 341-51.
20 H.R. RFP. No. 350, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 13-14 (1924).
21 Id., pt 2, at 4-16.
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theory that the nations which are favored are the progeny of the fictit-
ious and hitherto unsuspected Nordic ancestors, while those discrimi-
nated against are not classified as belonging to that mythical ancestral
stock. No scientific evidence worthy of consideration was introduced
to substantiate this pseudoscientific proposition. It is pure invention
and the creation of a journalistic imagination. All we know is that
these immigrants are all human beings and none of them is regarded by
the majority of the committee as undesirable as long as they meet the
test of the Act of 1917.
The suggestion contained in the majority report, that the
adoption of the 1890 census would accomplish an equitable apportion-
ment between immigration originating in northern and western Europe
and that emanating from southern and eastern Europe is based on a
palpable injustice .... It likewise ignores the important consideration
that it has been our proud boast that hitherto we have not distinguished
between men because of their race, creed, or nationality.
We of the minority make no distinction between the various
geographical divisions of Europe and entertain no prejudice against the
various nationalities. We seek to judge men by their inherent worth
and the manner in which they perform the duties of life.
Our American heritage of equality notwithstanding, the basic philosophy
of the 1924 Immigration Law remains as part of our national policy today.
With minor changes, it is the law of the land in the form of the McCarran-
Walter Act, otherwise known as the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952.22 We no longer exclude Asiatics upon the ground that they are racially
inadmissible. However, we do restrict immigration from Far Eastern countries
upon the basis of small racial quotas. Asiatics born in any part of the world
are admissible to the United States under such limitations. People other than
Asiatics are chargeable to quotas not on the basis of race but on the basis of
place of birth and national origin.23 Western Hemisphere countries have no
quota limitations with two exceptions.2 4 Asiatics are kept under a racial
quota, as noted above, and Western Hemisphere natives of colonies of Euro-
pean countries are chargeable to small colonial quotas rather than to the
quota of the mother country.25
No other democratic country in the world has as stringent or discrimi-
natory immigration laws as the United States. England, China, Sweden,
22 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1952). The annual quota of any quota area is 1/6 of I
percentum of the inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920. Presidential Proclamations set
forth the various quotas. Paoc. No. 2980, 66 Stat. c36, 8 U.S.C. 373 (1952), as amended, Paoc. No.
3147, 70 Stat. c48 (1956), 8 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1958), as amended, PRoc. No. 3158, 71 Stat. elO (1956),
8 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1958), as amended, PROC. No. 3188A, 71 Stat. c42 (1957), 8 U.S.C. 280 (Supp.
V 1958) as amended, PRoC. No. 3206, 8 U.S.C. 280 (Supp. V 1958).
23 66 Stat. 176, 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (1952). H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1952).
24 66 Stat. 169, 176, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (27) (c), 1152(a) 1952).
25 66 Stat. 177, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(c) (1952). This provision was aimed at curtailing negro immigra-
tion from the West Indies and is new with the 1952 Act. H.R. REP. No. 1365, op. cit. supra note 23,
at 38. Congressman Powell charged in the House debates:
This bill sets up a Cape Town-Washington, D.C. axis.... This bill makes this no
longer a land of the free, but a place only for Anglo-Saxons. It is racial discrimina-
tion, Mr. Author, because this bill removes from emigrating to the United States
the only group that does come here who are Negroes, the people of the West Indies.
98 Co NG. Rac. 4435, 4439 (1952). See also S. REP. No. 1137, 82 Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 5 (1952),
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France and Russia do not have quota limitations, nor laws which exclude
aliens because of race or nationality.26 Alfred E. Smith, former Governor of
New York, one-time Democratic Presidential candidate, and a leading
Catholic layman, wrote in November 1933:
I am fully aware of the persuasive arguments for cutting down un-
restricted immigration into this country. I have always suspected, how-
ever, that some of the more drastic provisions of our laws and some of
the national quotas which were established were fixed on the basis of
fantastic Aryan theories rather than American principles.
2 7
Former Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Earl G. Harrison, observed upon his retirement that the racial barriers and
discriminations in our immigration laws were in harmony with the theories of
Nazi Germany.2 Congressman Powell, in like vein complaining about the
1952 Act states: "The 1924 law early achieved notoriety for the racist senti-
ments which engendered it and the Ku Klux Klan support which insured its
passage. The McCarran-Walter bills perpetuate this obvious racist discrim-
ination.... 29
Theories of racial superiority and the concept of a master Ayran race
monopolizing social and intellectual values should have been buried with
Hitler. We have taken steps to remove all racial and national discrimina-
tions from our naturalization laws. The process of removing these cancer
sores of inequality from the statute books should be made complete. All
barriers in the immigration laws based on race and all discriminations against
nations should be removed. They represent undemocratic theories, repugnant
to American traditions and inconsistent with our international declarations.
We can remodel our immigration laws and retain yearly numerical limitations
without discriminatory standards.3 0 In so doing, we will promote friendlier
relations between the United States and other nations and fulfill the promise
that we shall treat all men as created equal.
II. THE IDEAL OF REASONABLENESS
Throughout the centuries, man has suffered under despotic and arbitrary
laws. "At times it has been his property that has been invaded; at times, his
privacy; at times, his liberty of movement; at times, his freedom of thought;
at times, his life."''1 The despotism of unreasonable laws has always earned
the moral indignation of history. The cruelty of the Draconian laws led
people to say that they were "written not in ink, but in blood. 132 The in-
26 See FRAZER, CONTROL OF ALIENS IN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS (1940); MAc-
KENZIE, LEGAL STATUS OF ALIENS IN PACIIc COUNTRIES (1937). Very few countries in the Western
Hemisphere have quota laws.
27 Smith, Can We Make Room for the Refugees?, New Outlook, Nov. 1933, p. 9.
28 Department of Justice, Press Release, July 20, 1944.
29 98 CONG. REe. 4438 (1952) (remarks of Congressman Powell).
30 Proposals to this effect were made by former Senator Lehman in 1955, S. 1206, 84th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1955), and by Congressman Celler in 1957, H.R. 3364, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). President
Eisenhower complained in his State of the Union Address on February 2, 1953 that: "Existing legis-
lation contains injustices. It does in fact discriminate." Nevertheless the bill proposed to Congress by
the Attorney General on January 31, 1957 would restrict quotas according to four geographical areas,
maintaining a modified form of discrimination.
31 United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 101 (1951) (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas).
32 MORTY, ANCIENT PEOPLES 128 (Countryman ed. 1943).
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justices of the French legal system under Louis XVI brought about the
French Revolution and eventually a democratic France. Arbitrary laws pro-
duced our American Revolution, and led to our present constitutional system
of government. The American tradition of a nation built up by immigrants
should make us realize that we should not treat the alien in our midst un-
reasonably. Nevertheless, early in our history, Congress enacted the un-
popular and short-lived Alien Act of June 25, 1798 providing for the arbi-
trary expulsion of dangerous aliens.83 The 1952 Immigration and Nationality
Act is said to rival the notorious Alien Act of 1798 in spirit and unpopular-
ity.34 Several guiding principles incorporated into our present law have been
productive of severe criticism. Re-examination of these principles would seem
appropriate if we are to strengthen our democratic processes.
A. Ex Post Facto Provisions
Prior to 19403- we had never attempted to deport aliens under retroactive
legislation. Under the 1952 Immigration Act all classes of deportable aliens
are retroactively subject to expulsion. 36 Aliens who committed non-deportable
offenses in 1925 and 1938 have been ordered deported after 1952 solely
by reason of the ex post facto operation of our present immigration laws.
3 7
Many students of constitutional law believe that the ex post facto prohibition
of our Constitution is applicable to civil as well as to criminal legislation.3"
The Supreme Court, however, has refused to apply this constitutional pro-
hibition to deportation statutes because of their civil nature.39 Whether
retroactive deportation legislation is civil or criminal, and, therefore, within
or without the bounds of the Constitution, is not nearly as important as
whether such type of enactment is fair and reasonable. Retroactive laws
"are generally deemed unfair, because, in the nature of the case, the person,
or persons, involved in the behavior to which such a law relates, can have had
no notice, when the behavior took place, of such an after-made law that
applies to it."' 40 This is particularly applicable to expulsion statutes, for
33 Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM; THE ALIEN AND SaDI-
TION ACTS 52-54, 193 (1951); KoNvrrz, THE ALIEN AND THE Asu'nc IN AMERICAN LAW 46-47 (1946).
No alien was ever deported under this law. Ibid.
34 The 1952 law has been assailed as an "affront to the conscience of America" (Rev. Walter Van
Kirk, 1952 HEAIN s BEFORE PREsmINr's COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 1508),
"worthy of Stalin and not of America" (Walter P. Reuther, id. at 1622), "a nefarious discriminatory
measure" (Brooklyn Borough President Cashmore, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1952, p. 11, col. 2.), "a
betrayal of our American Traditions" (Senator Kefauver and Governor Averill Harriman, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 13, 1952, p. 10, col. 2.), and "a bacchanalia of meanness" (Professors Henry M. Hart, Jr. and
Louis L. Jaffe of the Harvard Law School, 1952 HEARINGS, supra at 1575).
35 Under Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670, former members of the Communist Party
were made deportable by retroactive legislation enacted in 1940. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952).
36 66 Stat. 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1952).
37 Lehmann v. Carson, 353 U.S. 692 (1957); Mulcahy v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692 (1957); Mar-
cello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
38 1 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 324 (1953); De Witt, Are Legal-Tender Laws
Ex Post Facto?, 15 POL. SCI. Q. 96 (1900); McALLISTER, Ex Post Facto Laws in the Supreme Court
of the United States, 15 CALn. L. REv. 269, 270 (1927).
39 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Mar.
cello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
40 1 CROssKEY, op. cit. supra note 37, at 324.
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"deportation can be the equivalent of banishment or exile"'41 and "may result
also in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living. 42
However euphemistically deportation may be regarded in the dichotomy
between the civil and the criminal law, the fact remains that it is a penalty
4
1
and a dreadful punishment4 4 which should not be imposed retroactively.
Some countries, like Norway, Mexico, Portugal and Brazil, have express
constitutional provisions forbidding all retroactive laws. 45 The unfairness of
ex post facto civil laws which impose penalties as drastic as deportation should
lead us, as a matter of common decency, to forbid retroactive expulsion of
aliens.
B. Statutes of Limitations Restricting Deportation
Under the Immigration Act of 1891 aliens who entered in violation of
law were made subject to deportation for a period of one year after arrival.46
The 1903 Immigration Act increased this period of limitations to three years
47
and the 1917 Immigration Act4 s raised the period to five years for most
deportable offenses, eliminating, however, all limitations for criminal and
subversive grounds of deportation. The 1924 quota law provided no statutes
of limitations for those who entered without proper visas or for those who
overstayed.49 The McCarran-Walter Act has whittled the pre-existing five
year limitations under the 1917 Act so that a mere skeleton of token time
periods restrict deportation proceedings today.5°
The statutes of limitations enacted in the several states and by the federal
government are justified as a matter of necessity and convenience. They are
designed to spare the courts and individuals from litigation of stale claims
"after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence
has been lost." 51 Immigration proceedings are not spared from these stale
claims under existing law. Thus the alien and the government are forced into
litigation involving the legality of an entry in 192252 or the existence or non-
existence of an entry into the United States by a six-month-old boy in 1906.53
In some countries, such as Peru, an alien's admission for permanent
residence exempts him from deportation. In Brazil, aliens who are married to
41 Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947).
42 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 285 (1922).
43 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
44 United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1926).
45 2 DODD, MODERN CONsTrruTiONs 141-42, 175 (1900); 1 DODD, op. Cit. supra at 153.
46 Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 11, 26 Stat. 1086.
47 Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 21, 32 Stat. 1218.
48 Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889.
49 Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153.
50 Under the 1952 Immigration Act in four instances grounds of deportation must have occurred
"within five years after entry." These are 1) institutionalization at public expense for mental disease,
66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (3) (1952); 2) conviction for a single crime involving moral turpi-
tude, 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (4) (1952); 3) public charges; 66 Stat. 206, 8 U.S.C. §
1251 (a) (8) (1952); and 4) conviction for violation of Title I of the Alien Registration Act of 1940,
66 Stat. 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (15) (1952). These limitations, particularly those regarding mental
disease and economic distress, were provided "in accord with humanitarian principles." H.R. RE. No.
2096, 82d Cong., 2d Sss. 129 (1952).
51 Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). See also Guaranty Trust Co.
v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938).
52 In the Matter of A, 6 1. & N. Dec. 540 (1955).
53 In the Matter of Hoffman, Immigration File A-5,955, 899.
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citizens and who are responsible for the support of citizen children may not be
deported. The most common statute of limitations in foreign countries is a
five-year period.54
Under United States criminal statutes persons committing crimes not
punishable by death are generally protected by a five-year statute of limita-
tions.55 Arson, robbery, burglary, forgery, perjury, white slave traffic, assault
with a deadly weapon, and larceny are punishable only if criminal proceed-
ings are brought within a five-year period.
The President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, recom-
mending a ten-year limitation56 on all deportation proceedings, observed:
That it is wrong to keep the threat of punishment indefinitely over the
head of one who breaks the law is a principle deeply rooted in the
ancient traditions of our legal system. The law requires that criminal
prosecutions, except for capital offenses, such as murder and treason,
be brought within a fixed period of time or not at all. A similar dis-
pensation governs the enforcement of civil liabilities57
President Eisenhower has likewise recognized that fairness requires the
incorporation of a general statute of limitations in our present law.58 A just,
equitable and humanitarian law does not remove statutes of limitations. It
retains them.
C. Reasonable Standards
Under the McCarran-Walter Act, grounds of exclusion and deportation
rest in many instances upon the "opinion" or "satisfaction" of immigration or
consular employees. 59 Aliens are excludable when, in the opinion of consuls
or the Attorney General, they are likely to become public charges,60 or when
such officials have reason to believe that they seek to come here to engage in
prejudicial conduct 6' or subversive activities.62 Aliens are also subject to
deportation when, "in the opinion of the Attorney General," they have become
public charges within five years after entry, 63 or when their marriages have
been annulled and they fail to establish to the satisfaction of the Attorney
General that the marriages were not contracted to evade our immigration
laws. 64 "Heretofore, for the most part, deportation and exclusion have rested
upon finding of fact made upon evidence .... [T]he change from objective
findings to subjective feelings is not compatible with our system of justice."65
It has transformed our immigration system from a government of laws to the
absolutism of a governmental bureaucracy of men. Equally appalling are the
54 U.N., STUDY ON EXPULSION OF IMMIGRANTS (1955).
55 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1952).
56 See H.R. REP. No. 1312, '79th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1945) for similar recommendation.
57 1952 REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, Whom We
Shall Welcome, 197-98.
58 Letter From President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Senator Arthur V. Watkins, April 6, 1953, Item 8.
59 Subjective standards are employed in over 80 provisions. 98 CONG., Rac. 5112, 5154 (1952)
(remarks of Senator Lehman).
60 66 Stat. 183, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(15) (1952).
61 66 Stat. 184, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (27) (1952).
62 66 Stat. 186, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (29) (1952).
63 66 Stat. 206, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(8) (1952).
64 66 Stat. 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (c) (1952); cf. Karayannis v. Brownell, 251 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
65 President Truman's Veto Message, H.R. Doc. 520, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952).
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government's asserted exercise of arbitrary detention powers over aliens
under the 1952 Act.66 Aliens are excludable and deportable for the admission
of the essential elements of crimes involving moral turpitude.6 7 Under this
provision power is given to "minor immigration and consular -officials to act
as prosecutor, judge, and jury in determining whether acts constituting a
crime have been committed. '68 Equally objectionable are the provisions
authorizing the Attorney General to exclude or deport any alien who has
engaged, or has had a purpose to engage, in activities "prejudicial to the pub-
lic interest" or "subversive to the national security." 69
No standards or definitions are provided to guide discretion in the
exercise of powers so sweeping. To punish undefined 'activities' departs
from traditional insistence on established standards of guilt. To punish
an undefined 'purpose' is thought control.
These provisions are worse than the infamous Alien Act of 1798,
passed in a time of national fear and distrust of foreigners, which gave
the President power to deport any alien deemed 'dangerous to the peace
and safety of the United States.' Alien residents were thoroughly
frightened and citizens much disturbed by that threat to liberty.
Such powers are inconsistent with democratic ideals. Conferring
power like that upon the Attorney General is unfair to him as well as
our alien residents. Once fully informed of such vast discretionary
powers vested in the Attorney Gene.ral, Americans now would and
should be just as alarmed as Americans were in 1798 over less drastic
powers vested in the President. 70
D. Exclusion and Deportation of Rehabilitated Aliens
In 1917, when medical science was still in the horse and buggy era,
Congress determined to exclude aliens who had one previous attack of
insanity.71 Today, although great advances have been made in diagnosing,
treating and curing the mentally ill, we still arbitrarily exclude aliens who
have had an attack of insanity, no matter how mild, no matter how far distant
and no matter how complete the alien's recovery or rehabilitation. 7 No dis-
cretionary authority exists to waive this ground of exclusion for aliens seeking
permanent residence, although discretion does exist to waive criminal, im-
moral, or tubercular disabilities where the applicants for admission have
resident spouses or children here.73 Former members of the Communist
Party who have seen the light and renounced their unhappy past are not for-
given their sins for entry purposes unless they can show active opposition
against communism "to the satisfaction of the Attorney General.
'74 Past
nominal members of the Communist Party have been subjected to costly and
66 United States ex rel. Heiklkinen v. Gordon, 190 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1951), dismissed as moot, 344
U.S. 870 (1952); United States ex reL Pirinsky v. Shaughnessy, 177 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1949); Ex parte
Sentner,-94 F. Supp. 77 (E.D. Mo. 1950).
67 66 Stat. 182, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (9) (1952).
68 H.R. Doc. No. 520, op. cit. supra note 65, at 5-6.
69 66 Stat. 184, 186,206,8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (27), 1182(a) (29), 1251(a)(7) (1952).
7o H.R. Doc. No. 520, op. cit. supra note 65, at 6.
71 Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 875.
72 66 Stat. 182, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (1952).
73 71 Stat. 640 (1957), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b) (Supp. V, 1958).
74 66 Sta. 186, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (28) (I) (1952).
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lengthy deportation prosecutions. 75  Forgiveness is likewise restricted for
rehabilitated aliens with criminal records. They may be pardoned only where
they have resident spouses or children and the Attorney General determines
to exercise his discretion favorably because of extreme hardship and the
public interest.
76
Judge Panken's observations in Zy v. Zy, 77 might be noted here to assist
us in framing a more worthy approach to this problem. He said:
Sinners are not condemned to sin in perpetuity. They are not con-
demned to sin throughout their lives because they had sinned. Since
man has risen to the high cultural stature which is his, rehabilitation,
reformation of the delinquent has become his objective.
Sin is not always the result of a will to sin. Education,
environment or lack of education are not infrequently responsible for
the sin committed. Economic disadvantage sometimes causes sin to be
committed The sinner is to be helped to rehabilitate himself. To
refuse help to such is sinful.78
An alien's past should be overlooked if he has been completely rehabilitated.
His past, whether it be a life of crime, immorality, mental illness or improper
affiliation should remain buried - if the alien himself is no longer in league
with it. This would be in conformity with accepted notions of reasonableness
which would likewise eliminate ex post facto provisions, prescribe a fair
statute of limitations and remove arbitrary standards from our immigration
statute.
III. THE IDEAL OF FAIRNESS
A. Hearing Procedures
In a recent address at the Harvard Law School, Professor Bernard
Schwartz decried the shocking manner in which federal governmental agencies
operate, despite procedural safeguards which are adequate in theory but not
in practice. 79
Theoretically, most federal agencies 0 comply with the Administrative
Procedure Act,8' which was designed to bring a greater degree of justice and
fairness to the procedures of the fourth branch of government, the adminis-
trative agencies. Separation of investigatory and prosecuting operations from
quasi-judicial functions, as well as completely independent hearing officers,
are required by that act.82 The commingling of these functions permitted on
behalf of agencies prior to the date of the Administrative Procedure Act was
considered highly undesirable. The deportation hearing was considered "a
perfect exemplification of the practices so unanimously condemned. 83
75 Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957); Latva v. Nicholls, 106 F. Supp. 658 (D. Mass. 1952).
See Letter From President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Senator Arthur V. Watkins, April 6, 1953.
76 71 Stat. 640, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b) (Supp. 1957).
77 13 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1939).
78 -1d. at 419-20.
79 See Harvard Law School Record, April 3, 1958.
80 See agencies listed in 1957 OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATVE PROCEDuRE ANN. REP. 12-14.
81 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001-11 (1952).
82 60 Stat. 240, 241, 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1004(c), 1006(c), 1010 (1952).
83 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 45 (1949).
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The Department of Justice which sponsored the Administrative Proce-
dure Act84 found it a highly meritorious safeguard for every agency except
its own Immigration and Naturalization Service. First, it opposed application
of the act to immigration controversies in the courts.85 It then secured exemp-
tion from the act for immigration matters under special legislation86 by repre-
sentations that utilization of separate hearing and prosecuting officers in
immigration cases would require more personnel and more money with an
immediate expenditure of $3,980,000 and eventually up to $30,000,000.87
This consideration undoubtedly influenced Congress to continue this exemp-
tion in the 1952 Immigration Act 8 over the protests of many organizations,
including the American Bar Association.89 However, the Immigration Service
has now discovered that its representations about the costs of two-men hear-
ings were grossly exaggerated. As a result of hearings before the House Com-
mittee on Government Operations, exposing procedural shortcomings in the
efficiency of the Immigration Service, examining officers were assigned first
to all important deportation cases9" and then to all contested cases to repre-
sent the interests of the government. 91 With efficiently revised immigration
procedures permitting aliens to plead to orders to show cause,92 the Immigra-
tion Service has been able to function in immigration proceedings with two
men - an examiner and a hearing officer, known as a special inquiry officer.
The result has been a reduction of personnel and expense.93 No excuse
therefore remains for non-compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act,
except the unwillingness of the Immigration Service to subject itself to the
fair procedures of the act. The need for compliance as a matter of fairness is
still pressing.
A contested immigration hearing can be, and sometimes is, a one-sided,
anti-alien star chamber proceeding. Notice of charges are not given in
exclusion hearings. 94 In deportation proceedings charges amounting to vague
generalities are sometimes supplied. The alien cannot ask for a bill of
particulars, nor can he examine witnesses before his administrative trial. Pre-
trial discovery and subpoena powers are not available to him at this stage.95
84 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 249 (1946).
85 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1949).
86 Act of Sept. 27, 1950, ch. 1052, ch. III, § 101, 64 Stat. 1048.
87 Hearings on Supplemental Appropriations Bill for 1951 Before the Appropriations Committee
of the House, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 375 (1950); Hearings on Supplemental Appropriations for 1951
Before the Appropriations Committee of the Senate, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 752-53 (1950).
88 66 Stat. 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1952); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1954).
89 Hearings on S. 716, H.R. 2379, and H.R. 2816 Before the Joint Subcommittees of the Commit-
tees on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 526 (1951).
90 House Comm. on Government Operations, Practices and Procedures of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service in Deportation Proceedings, H.R. RsP. 1458, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1955).
91 1955 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE REP. 18; Department of Justice, Press Release,
Aug. 9, 1955; 21 Fed. Reg. 97-102 (1956); 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.9(b), 242.16(c) (1958).
92 8 C.F.R. § 241.1 (1958).
93 1957 ATr'y GEN. ANN. RaP. 442-43.
94 Due process would require such notice for an alien who has been lawfully admitted and is
seeking re-entry. Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1952); Malaxa v. Brownell, Civil No. 922-56,
D.D.C., Dec. 7, 1955; U.S. ex rel. Malaxa v. Brownell, 139 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Fla. 1956).
95 66 Stat. 199, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1952) authorizes immigration officials to subpoena the at-
tendance of witnesses and the production of books relating to any person's right to enter or remain in
the United States. See Shaughnessy v. Bacolas, 135 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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His opponent, the Immigration Service, on the other hand, has all these pre-
trial remedies. Witnesses can be subpoenaed and statements taken under
oath. The subpoena power can be enforced by judicial sanctions. 96 That
there is power to question aliens seeking entry is unquestioned. Whether
aliens may be required to give testimony against themselves is not clear from
the statutory language of the McCarran-Walter Act.97 In any event, it is
common practice for immigration officials to take recorded statements from
applicants for admission and from deportees who are often without legal
representation and not even advised of their right to counsel. 8 Thus, the
Immigration Service has all the advantages of pre-trial discovery. The alien
has none. The Service can be fully prepared for hearing. The alien cannot.
At the hearing the same unfairness prevails. The alien is almost always
the first witness called by the Immigration Service so that he may be trapped
into inconsistencies before hearing the adverse testimony. The Immigration
Service represented by an immigration inspector exercises subpoena powers
without restriction,99 and without advising the alien in advance of who will
be called. The alien, on the contrary, must file a written application for a
subpoena with the presiding inspector who issues it only when the materiality
of the prospective witness' testimony is demonstrated. The written application
is then filed with the alien's immigration file in the possession of the inspector
who is also the alien's adversary. Thus, the alien's opponent has advance
notice of his witnesses, a privilege denied to him. Production of documents
is easily accomplished by the alien's opponent, the Immigration Service. For
the alien, however, favorable documents in the government's possession are
often withheld upon the ground of privilege, whether they relate to the merits
or to cross-examination. 100
By law and by regulations, having the force and effect.of law,1 1 special
inquiry officers, in deportation0 2 and exclusion proceedings 03 are required
to conduct fair and impartial hearings. There are, however, obvious limita-
tions upon these special inquiry officers who are subject to the administrative
supervision of superior officers who exercise prosecuting and investigatory
functions.
What special inquiry officer will issue a subpoena for the testimony of
his District Director, Regional Commissioner or the Commissioner of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service who can transfer, promote and
96 66 Stat. 199, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1952). Compare the practices of the Immigration Service with
the present and proposed practices of other agencies in this field. 1957 OFFICE OF ADMINISTRAVE
PROCEDURE ANN. REP. 41.
97 Cf. United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1955).
98 8 C.F.R. § 242.10 (1958). The practice had been sustained by the courts prior to the 1952 Act.
Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 469-79 (1912); Ex parte Vilarino, 50 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.
1931). The 1952 Act, however, expressly gives an alien the right to counsel in deportation and ex-
clusion cases. 66 Stat. 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1952).
99 66 Stat. 198, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1952).
100 This procedure is contrary to recent judicial rulings. Communist Party of the United States v.
Subversive Activities Control Board, 254 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Petrowicz v. Holland, 142 F.
Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
101 United States ex rel Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265 (1953).
102 Sardo v. McGrath, 196 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1952); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33
(1949).
103 O'Connell ex rel. Kwong Han Foo v. Ward, 126 F.2d 615 (1st Cir. 1942).
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demote him? Special inquiry officers frequently deny an alien's request to
adjourn a hearing. You will seldom see them deny the government's request
for a postponement. I have read decisions of such officers criticizing an alien
and his counsel but have yet to see a decision in which such criticism was
leveled at the Immigration Service or its representatives. Is the type of system
which produces this state of affairs one of complete fairness and impartiality?
The disadvantages to the alien of unilateral pre-trial discovery and anti-
alien hearing procedures are not required by the McCarran-Walter Act. They
are the product of administrative instructions. They- can and should be
remedied.
Special inquiry officers are t'he trial judges over our immigration laws.
Full impartiality, however, is psychologically impossible for these trial judges
until they have complete independence by appointment pursuant to section
11 of the Administrative Procedure Act'0 4 and thorough divestment from the
administrative control of the Immigration Service.
B. Use of Confidential Information
On April 10, 1958, the Solicitor General acknowledged before the
Supreme Court that an American citizen had a constitutional right to travel
abroad, but that such right might be abrogated by denial of a passport based
upon confidential information.105 The use of confidential information against
citizens in passport cases, in loyalty controversies involving governmental
employment, 1 6 and in merchant seamen cases' 0 7 illustrates the proposition
that "aliens are often merely the initial victims of restraints subsequently
applied to citizens."'1 8
It was against aliens that confidential information was first utilized
extensively. During World War II, regulations were published in November,
1941 to authorize the Attorney General to exclude aliens without hearings
upon the basis of secret information. 109 The power to exclude without a
hearing on undisclosed information was intended to be utilized in exceptional
and extraordinary spy cases where the Attorney General believed disclosure
would be against the public interest.110 Unfortunately, this wartime device
has become a permanent part of our peacetime immigration procedures"'
and has been utilized extensively to exclude European refugees,"' war
104 60 Stat. 244, 5 U.S.C. § 1010 (1952). This section requires the Civil Service Commission to
fix the qualifications of special inquiry officers and determine their salary and tenure.
105 Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 145 (1958).
106 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341
U.S. 918 (1950).
107 Parker v. Lester 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
108 BARTH, THE LOYALTY OF FREE MEN (1951). Mr. Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in Jay v.
Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956), said:
If sanction of this use and effect of 'confidential' information is confirmed against
this petitioner an alien by a process of judicial reasoning, it may be recognized
as a principle of law to be extended against American citizens in a myriad of
ways. Id. at 362.
109 12 Fed. Reg. 5142 (1947).
110 1952 HEARINGS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 13.
111 66 Stat. 199, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1952).
112 Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Bills to Amend the Displaced Persons Act
of 1948, 81st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 664-65 (1949-1950).
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brides 1 3 and returning residents, 114 as well as countless Canadians 1 5 and
South Americans who seek to come here as visitors on legitimate business or
pleasure trips. It is utilized not only in exclusion cases but also in cases in-
volving adjustment of an alien's status to that of a permanent resident upon
grounds of hardship 1 6 and under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953."1 Stays
of deportation 18 upon the ground that an alien might be physically perse-
cuted in the place of deportation are likewise determined on the basis of off-
the-record material." 9 The sorry part of this extensive utilization of non-
record information by our immigration authorities is that it is reliance upon
the rankest and lowest form of rumor and hearsay. It is merely "hearsay
evidence, which could not be gotten in the record,"' 20 or evidence whose
source is no longer available and which could not withstand attack at a hear-
ing.121
Significantly, where adverse publicity or stinging Supreme Court dissents
disturbed the Attorney General, he determined that nondisclosure was no
longer in the public interest and accorded the alien involved a traditional on-
the-record hearing.
22
It is small wonder, therefore, that such sharp criticisms have been
leveled at the nondisclosure of confidential information.
Security is like liberty in that many are the crimes committed
in its name .... In the name of security the police state justifies its
arbitrary oppressions on evidence that is secret, because security might
be prejudiced if it were brought to light in hearings. The plea that
evidence of guilt must be secret is abhorrent to free men, because it
provides a cloak for the malevolent, the misinformed, the meddle-
some, and the corrupt to play the role of informer undetected and un-
corrected.'
23
113 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1949). Exclusions without a hear-
ing have been disapproved by the American Bar Association. 8 AD. BULL. 7-8 (1955).
114 Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1952); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1952).
115 The adverse information against Canadians is often in the form of hearsay reports supplied by
the Royal Canadian Police. Although there is a requirement that nondisclosure of confidential informa-
tion be predicated on the public interest, it is questionable whether such prerequisite exists in these
cases.
116 66 Stat. 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) (1952); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956). After the Jay
v. Boyd decision, the Immigration Commissioner restricted the use of confidential information in this
type of case by the promulgation of new regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1958).
117 67 Stat. 403 (1953), 50 U.S.C. § 1971(d) (Supp. V 1958); Chao Li Chi v. Murff, 250 F.2d
854 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 919 (1958).
118 66 Stat. 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1952).
119 See United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 928 (1953).
120 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Legal and Monetary Affairs of the House Committee on
Government Operations on Practices and Procedures of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
in Deportation Proceedings, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 18,67 (1955).
121 Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 111.
122 After excluding Ellen Knauff without a hearing, United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537 (1950), the Attorney General granted her a hearing which resulted in her clearance.
KNAUFF, Tan ELLEN KNAUFF STORY (1952). Ignatz Mezei was denied a hearing at first, Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), but was granted one and released on parole.
Cecil Jay was denied suspension of deportation on off the record evidence, Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345
(1956). After this last Supreme Court decision, the Immigration Commissioner adopted a more re-
strictive policy concerning the use of such materials. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17 (1958). In numerous rehearings
under the new regulations the aliens have been cleared.
123 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (dissenting opinion of
Justice Jackson).
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Or as stated by Justice Douglas in Peters v. Hobby:124 "When we relax our
standards to accommodate the faceless informer, we violate our basic con-
stitutional guarantees and ape the tactics of those whom we despise."
Justice Black, dissenting in Jay v. Boyd,12 5 emphatically stated his
opinion of nondisclosure of confidential information: "No amount of legal
reasoning by the Court and no rationalization that can be devised can dis-
guise the fact that the use of anonymous information to banish people is not
consistent with the principles of a free country." Addressing himself to the
same question, Justice Frankfurter, also dissenting in Jay v. Boyd,'2 6 said:
President Eisenhower has explained what is fundamental in any
American code. A code devised by the Attorney General for deter-
mining human rights cannot be less than Wild Bill Hickok's code in
Abilene, Kansas:
'It was: .... In this country, if someone dislikes you, or
accuses you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide
behind the shadow. He cannot assassinate you or your
character from behind, without suffering the penalties an
outraged citizenry will impose.' Press release of remarks
of the President, on November 23, 1953, on receiving Ameri-
ca's Democratic Legacy Award at dinner on the occasion of
the 40th anniversary of the Anti-Defamation League.
Practices and procedures under our immigration law in utilizing con-
fidential information violate the fundamental American code described by
the President. The Immigration Service should suffer the penalties an outraged
citizenry will impose.
IV. THE IDEAL OF RESPECT FOR FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
In 1936 the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice found close to three thousand cases pending in the department which were
of such "incredibly cruel family separations . . . so repugnant to every
American principle of justice and humanity" that deportation was tempor-
arily stayed so that Congress might take some action.' Four years later,
statutory authorization was granted to suspend the deportation' 28 of any
alien who (a) proved good moral character for the preceding five years; (b)
had a citizen or resident spouse, parent or minor child who would suffer
serious economic hardship if the alien were deported; (c) was not racially
inadmissible or ineligible for naturalization; and (d) was not subject to
deportation on criminal, mental, physical, narcotic or subversive charges. 129
In 1948 this deportation suspension section of the law was amended'3 0 to
124 349 U.S. 331, 352 (1955).
125 351 U.S. 345, 367 (1956) (dissenting opinion). See also Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th
Cir. 1955); Alexiou v. McGrath, 101 F. Supp. 421 (D.D.C. 1951); Maeztu v. Brownell, 132 F. Supp.
751 (D.D.C. 1955); Orahovats v. Brownell, 134 F. Supp. 84 (D.D.C. 1955); Boudin v. Dulles, 136
F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955).
126 351 U.S. 345, 372-73 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
127 H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 392, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1935).
128 When suspension of deportation is granted, the alien's status is changed from an illegal resi-
dent to that of a lawful and permanent resident. Congressional approval, however, is required in these
cases.
129 Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 672.
180 Act of July 1, 1948, ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206.
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permit racially ineligible aliens to qualify as well as those aliens without
family ties who arrived here on or before July 1, 1948 and who had seven
years residence. These provisions of the law were criticized upon the ground
that an alien could enter the United States illegally, acquire a wife and child-
ren or long residence and remain.1 31 To remedy this so-called abuse, Congress
eliminated the previous statutory provisions132 and provided new stand-
ards. 133 These all but abolish the concept of suspending deportation for those
with family ties. The restrictions include:
1. Entry into the United States after June 27, 1950 is a prerequisite
(except for those deportable on certain criminal,1 3 ' narcotic, 135 subver-
sive' 38 or immoral' 37 grounds.)1 38 Thus, at present the statute presents the
incongruous result of precluding suspension to those who entered without
documents or overstayed prior to June 27, 1950 but allowing it for criminals,
narcotic violators, subversives and prostitutes. 139
2. Continuous physical presence in the United States is required for a
five or ten 4 ' year period. If the statute is read literally, an hour in Mexico
during this period, or even presence on board an American vessel may break
the alien's continuity of physical presence.' 4 '
3. A final order of deportation entered under the McCarran-Walter Act
prior to the application for suspension precludes relief. If this means that our
authorities are prevented from vacating a prior order of deportation in order
to grant this discretionary relief, 142 then their previous mistake or changed
circumstances are not to be given consideration. This would be a harsh,
senseless and arbitrary rule. of law.
4. Good moral character is required for the statutory period of five or
ten years. No one can quarrel with this requirement. However, the act con-
tains arbitrary standards precluding the establishment of good moral charac-
ter. A man who has been jailed for traffic violations for one hundred and
eighty days or convicted of playing poker during the statutory period cannot
be regarded as a person of good character. 43
5. Aliens who are natives of a contiguous territory or of an adjacent
island and who are eligible for entry outside the quota144 are not eligible for
131 S. RiEP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 600 (1950).
132 The previous legal requirements with modifications were continued under Act of June 27,
1952, ch. 477, § 244, 66 Stat. 214 until December 24, 1957 when they expired.
133 66 Stat. 214, 215, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1254(a) (2)-(a) (5) (1952).
134 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(4)-(a)(5) (1952); 66 Stat. 207, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(16)-
(a)(17) (1952).
135 66 Stat. 206, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (11) (1952).
136 66 Stat. 205, 206, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(6)-(a)(7) (1952).
137 66 Stat. 207, 208, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251 (a) (12), 1251(a) (18) (1952).
138 For those in the four enumerated groups ten years physical presence is required and the date
of entry is immaterial.
139 Congressman Walter is seeking to remedy this defect by the enactment of H.R. 11874, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
140 66 Stat. 214, 215, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1254(a)(2)-(a)(3) (1952) require five years physical presence.
66 Stat. 215, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1254(a)(4)-(a)(5) (1952) require ten years physical presence.
141 See Montalban v. Brownell, 157 F. Supp. 391 (D.D.C. 1957); Ching Lan Foo v. Brownell, 148
F. Supp. 420 (D.D.C. 1957).
142 See In the Matter of M, 5 . & N. Dec. 472 (1953).
143 66 Stat. 172, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (f) (1952).
144 Natives of Canada, South America, and other Western Hemisphere countries are not within
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the deportation suspension no matter how meritorious their cases, no matter
what their financial condition might be and no matter how great the hardship
involved in leaving our shores.' 45
6. Finally, aliens may only be granted suspension of deportation where
in the opinion of the Attorney General deportation would result in "excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship" to the alien, or to his citizen or
resident spouse, parent, or child. Thus, as now worded, the long-time resident
alien without family ties may no longer secure suspension, and the married
alien is obliged to prove that his deportation will result in extremely unusual
hardship. This remedy
should be available only in the very limited category of cases in
which the deportation of the alien would be unconscionable. Hardship
or even unusual hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent or child
is not sufficient to justify suspension of deportation.
146
Can hardship or even unusual hardship be weighed thus in pounds of
heartache or misery on the scales of the blindfolded Goddess of Justice?' 47
In the congressional debates on this provision, Representative Zablocki
complained:
The requirement to the effect that the applicant, in order to
qualify for a suspension, would have to prove that deportation would
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his immediate
family, is not only very stringent but encompasses areas which are in-
tangible, difficult to define, and involve an evaluation of the emotional
content in any family life. Its operation might result in tragic family
separations. 148
President Truman in his veto message' 49 observed:
The bill would sharply restrict the present opportunity of citizens
and alien residents to save family members from deportation .... The
bill would prevent... discretion from being used in many cases where
it is now available, and would narrow the circle of those who can
obtain relief from the letter of the law. This is most unfortunate,
because the bill, in its other provisions, would impose harsher restric-
tions and greatly increase the number of cases deserving equitable relief.
Professors Hart and Jaffe of Harvard Law School reacted to the suspen-
sion provisions of the 1952 Immigration Act with the declaration that:
"Rarely has there been a bolder statement of a national purpose to be
cruel."'8 0
the quotas unless they are Asiatics or chargeable to colonial quotas. See discussion under Point I,
supra.
145 66 Stat. 216, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b) (1952). They must go abroad, secure a visa and return.
146 S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1952).
147 President Eisenhower, in his letter to Senator Watkins, note 58, supra, took cognizance of the
complaints that this standard of hardship was not defined. Professor Jaffe of the Harvard Law School
remarked that:
... the Attorney General is being asked to trade in distinctions of misery and
here we have involved the interest of citizens of this country because this man
will usually have a wife or children here, and the Attorney General is put in this
invidious and administratively undefensible position of making distinctions be-
tween extreme and extremely unusual hardship.
1952 HEARiNGs BEFORE PRESmENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 1568.
148 98 CoNo. Rac. 4443 (1952).
149 H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 520, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952).
150 1952 HnARINoS, supra note 147, at 1576.
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I question whether any alleged abuses of the previous law warranted
this excursion into the realm of harshness and cruelty. In Brazil dependent
family ties preclude deportation without any residence requirement or other
restrictions.' 51
The social, moral, and economic consequences of separating families
cannot be overlooked. We recognize the sanctity of the marital relationship
in every marriage ceremony. Only strong overriding considerations like
punishment for crime should warrant separation of husband and wife. One
of the underlying intentions of our immigration laws is said to be the pre-
servation of the family unit, 152 but mere lip service is given this consideration
in the suspension sections. Banishment and exile from one's family for immi-
gration violations should not turn on so tenuous a reed as the distinction
between unusual hardship and extremely unusual hardship, or a trip across
the border to Mexico for supper and the other arbitrary innovations inspired
by the present statute.
V. THE IDEAL OF CLARITY AND SIMPLICITY
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 has been amended nine
times since its enactment. 153 The Attorney General is seeking further amend-
ments. 54 There are many, including myself, who would rewrite the law in its
entirety. It is the longest and most cumbersome statute in the world dealing
with immigration and citizenship. From a grammatical point of view it is as
poorly written as any law I have ever read. 15 Some of its provisions are
clearly unconstitutional.' 56 Other provisions are so unwieldy that is is difficult
to ascertain their meaning. They spread the welcome mat for lawsuit after
lawsuit.
Senator Lehman's executive assistant, Julius Edelstein, aptly stated:
The Story of Creation, the entire account of the making of the Uni-
verse - of the firmament and the earth and the waters thereof, and
151 U.N., STUDY ON ExPULSION OF IMMIGRANTS (1955).
152 H.R. Misc. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1952).
153 67 Stat. 108 (1953), 8 U.S.C. § 1440(a) (Supp. V 1958); 68 Stat. 264 (1954), 8 U.S.C. §
1184(a) (Supp. V 1958); 68 Stat. 495 (1954), 8 U.S.C. § 1438 Supp. V 1958); 68 Stat. 1145 (1954),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (Supp. V 1958); 68 Stat. 1164 (1954), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. V 1958); 70 Stat.
50 (1956), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (Supp. V 1958); 70 Stat. 241 (1956), 22 U.S.C. § 1446 (Supp. V
1958); 70 Stat. ,575 (1956), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23), 1251(a)(11), 1251(b) (Supp. V 1958); 71
Stat. 643 (1957), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b), 1182(b)-(c), 1201(a), 1205, 1255(a)-(b), (Supp. V 1958).
154 Letter From Attorney General Brownell to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the Vice President, Jan. 31, 1957. See also Department of Justice, Press Release, Jan. 31, 1957. The
recommendations have been incorporated in bills introduced by Senator Watkins, S. 1006, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1958), Congressman Keating, H.R. 11167, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
155 In 1952 HEARINGS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALI-
ZATION 774 (1952), Professor Rheinstein of the Chicago Law School testified:
May I call your attention to section 202 which I think nobody can understand
until he has read it 12 times. If and when a revision of this law is undertaken I
hope to goodness somebody will be called in as an expert in English. As it stands
now, it is an abomination on the English language. It is even worse than the
Code of Internal Revenue.
156 66 Stat 268, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b) (1952) provides for a conclusive presumption effectuating
voluntary expatriation where a dual-national remains in the state of his foreign nationality for ten
years. 66 Stat. 260, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1952) provides for revocation of naturalization for refusal to
testify as to alleged subversive activities within ten years after naturalization. The unconstitutionality
of these provisions seems clear to me. In addition, the recent decision in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958), would seem to spell the invalidation of the expatriation provisions of the 1952 Act based on
desertion, draft evasion, and treason. See 66 Stat. 268, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8)-(10) (1952).
JUSTICE AND OUR IMMIGRATION LAWS
of the creatures that inhabit the earth, including man and woman, takes
two brief chapters in the Book of Genesis, amounting to exactly 1,428
words.
But the McCarran-Walter Act which establishes the statutory basis
for the immigration, visitation, deportation and naturalization policies
of the United States could not be compressed into less than four titles,
13 chapters, and 144 sections.'
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Senator Moody remarked:
Why is this legislation labeled as a codification and, therefore, a simpli-
fication, when the test of whether admitting an alien is in the public
interest appears as subclause (b) of clause (ii) of subparagraph (28)
of subsection (a) of section 212 of Chapter I of Title II of Chapter 6
of Title VIII of the United States Code 'dealing with immigration
matters? What is clear or simple about that?158
Former Attorney General McGranery testified on October 27, 1952,
that our immigration laws are complicated by a cumbersome numbering
system and numerous ambiguities.' 59
The mad Roman tyrant, Caligula, had his laws written in fine print and
posted high in the market place. Of course, no one could read them. The
cumbersome and ambiguous provisions of the 1952 Act are equally beyond
the vision of most lawyers and laymen because they lack clarity and simplicity.
For this reason alone, the McCarran-Walter Act should be rewritten. Laws
which are ambiguous and cannot be understood are traps for the unwary and
pitfalls for the innocent. They are neither just nor fair.
CONCLUSION
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 brought some improve-
ments to our immigration laws. 10 The advances of the act, however, are far
outweighed by its shortcomings,' 0 ' consisting of repeated failures to incor-
porate rudimentary concepts of justice and fair play. The 1952 Immigration
Act should be completely rewritten to meet the following objections:
1. It does not eliminate race as a bar to immigration as its authors
proclaimed. 162 It discriminates by quota provisions upon the basis of
race, national origin, and birth in colonial possessions. This deficiency
is not in keeping with our foreign policy, our international declarations,
157 Federal Bar News, June 1956, p. 283. Compare the Canadian Immigration statute of eighty-
two sections and the Philippine Immigration Act of fifty-four sections with the McCarran-Walter Act.
Other countries boast of more simplified but equally effective immigration laws.
158 98 CONG. R-c. 5212 (1952).
159 1952 HEARINGS, supra note 147, at 1350.
160 Practically no one is denied a quota allocation. But see the case of an Indonesian born
Chinese who apparently can secure no quota allocation. The Chinese World, April 14, 1958. Re-
habilitated criminals, subversives, and prostitutes who meet certain limited restrictions are permitted
to remain here. Persons whose skills will aid our national welfare are granted preferential treatment.
161 President Truman in his veto message stated:
Time and again, examination discloses that the revisions of existing law that
would be made by the bill are intended to solidify some restrictive practice of
our immigration authorities or to overrule or modify some ameliorative decision
of the Supreme Court or other Federal Courts. By and large, the changes that
would be made by the bill do not depart from the basically restrictive spirit of
our existing law - but intensify and reinforce it.
H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 520, supra note 149, at 8.
162 H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1952).
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our traditions, or our aspirations. All existing discriminations contrary to
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be
eliminated. 163
2. By subjective standards and provisions which operate ex post facto,
contain no statute of limitations, and which fail to take account of
rehabilitation, an alien is kept in fear of deportation under present law
for the rest of his life.' 64 The inherent worth of an individual should be
controlling under modern immigration laws. Retroactive and ex post
facto deportation proscriptions should be outlawed as an uncivilized
practice unworthy of a great democracy. Objective standards should
replace the present subjective guides and a statute of limitations from
five to ten years for all deportable offenses should be adopted.'65
3. The Administrative Procedure Act, including its requirement for
independent hearing officers, should be an integral part of the immi-
gration process. Confidential information should not be utilized. The
procedure requiring confrontation of witnesses and cross-examination
which was utilized for some sixty years prior to World War II, without
hysterical fears of subversive infiltrations, should be restored in keeping
with our Anglo-American concepts of justice and fairness.
4. Adequate consideration for aliens with family ties should be, once
again, a respected ideal of our immigration policy. I am opposed to the
deportation of an alien who has an American spouse or child. For crim-
inal, immoral, or subversive infractions, he can and should be punished
under our criminal laws. There is no need to super-impose the dreaded
ban of exile which has been "abandoned by the common consent of all
civilized peoples."' 66 This is particularly true where the alien's conduct
occurred in the remote past and he is presently a person of good moral
character.
5. To the foregoing guideposts for a new immigration statute, I would
add the requirement that it be written in clear, simple and direct lan-
guage, so that it might be fully and easily understood by the lawyer,
layman, administrator and judge.
Our Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 is sadly wanting in these
major respects. When it is rewritten (and some day it will be) let us hope
that it will become a shining exemplification of the universal ideal of justice.
163 Point I, supra.
164 Even after naturalization an individual's citizenship is subject to revocation. 66 Stat. 260, 8
U.S.C. § 1451 (1952).
165 See Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law, 56 COLUm. L. Rav. 325-27 (1956), for a de-
tailed treatment of this proposal.
166 United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1926). The American public was
recently shocked to learn that after a deportation battle of eleven years William Heikkila had been
bundled off on April 18, 1957 and deported to Finland without any opportunity to say farewell to his
American wife or consult his attorney. Heikkila who came here at the age of two and a half months
is a product of America. Whatever his shortcomings, it is indeed a barbarous and monstrous law
which requires his banishment. Heikkila has been brought back to the United States to continue his
deportation fight, and the Immigration Commissioner insists he will again deport Heikkila even if it
takes another eleven years. See 104 CONG. REc. 6321 (daily ed. April 23, 1958) (remarks of Con-
gressman Shelley).
